In the transition from full-cycle production of complex products and all their major components in every enterprise to network organization of production with the release of specialized production for each component a number of problems arise. In particular, isolated - certainly few - specialized suppliers acquire significant market power on the component market issued by them. Caused by this increase in selling prices of purchased components may exceed the savings achieved through the reduction of production cost components at specialized enterprises. In this paper, based on the author´s model of bilateral oligopoly as a closed queuing system evaluated oligopolistic surcharge to the price component. The method proposed makes it possible to assess the effectiveness of the transition from full-cycle production of complex products in each enterprise to the network structure of the industry, taking into account the impact of market power of the components suppliers.
the network structure of the industry, bilateral oligopoly, queuing theory, price formation, the market power of the suppliers, the criterion of optimal organizational structure of the industry.
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